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Introduction and Historical Framework
1 Pragmatism and analytic  philosophy are two very complex and ramified schools  of
thought, two ways of conceiving the philosophical work, both of which extremely hard
to define in a satisfactory and shared manner. For this reason, the attempt to make a
study of their relations and interactions, encounters and clashes, may seem even more
risky and uncertain. But New Perspectives on Pragmatism and Analytic Philosophy (Rodopi
2011), edited by Rosa Calcaterra, shows that on the opposite it is exactly through this
comparison, built from different points of views, that we can gain a fresh and deep
understanding of both of them. The volume offers an investigation that works on an
historical  and  theoretical  standpoint  at  once.  It  collects  contributions  by  Vincent
Colapietro, Mario De Caro, Rossella Fabbrichesi, Maurizio Ferraris, Nathan Houser, Ivo
Assad Ibri, Giovanni Maddalena, Michele Marsonet, John McDowell and Eva Picardi, all
of which show that the dialogue between the two schools has proven and proves to be
surprisingly  fruitful,  not  only  in  highlighting  the  main  characteristics  of  the  two
interlocutors, but also in putting on the foreground new ways of conceiving traditional
themes. It is indeed now almost impossible to catch the key features of neopragmatism
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without  reference  to  the  analytic  tradition,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  almost
impossible  to  understand  the  key  features  of  post-positivist  analytic  philosophy
without reference to the revival of some traditional pragmatist themes.
2 Rosa Calcaterra’s “Introduction” provides a useful framework which contextualizes the
recent developments of research in the historical roots of the relation between classical
pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy,  both  in  the  United  States  and  in  Europe.
Pragmatism dominated  the  American  academic  scene  until  the  arrival  of  the  most
prominent representatives of the Vienna Circle from Europe, who first interacted with,
and later ousted the pragmatists  from what was considered “serious” philosophical
work, seeing them as lacking the necessary logical and epistemological rigor. In Europe,
too, pragmatism had to face numerous critiques, and it almost disappeared during the
establishment of the new currents of phenomenology, Marxism and hermeneutics. It
was in the Sixties that in both contexts, US and Europe, pragmatism was revitalized, as
it could easily become an allied of new perspectives centered on practical philosophy
and  concerned  with  the  problems  of  action,  fallibilism,  and  the  relation  between
objectivity and intersubjectivity.  What can be traced is  a sort of  double movement,
aiming at the revision of the neoempirist epistemological paradigm on the one hand,
and at the reinstatement of the pragmatist method in the context of the contemporary
world and philosophical debate, on the other. Calcaterra focuses on some key figures of
what  has  been  called  the  pragmatic  turn  in  contemporary  thought:  Otto  Apel  and
Jürgen Habermas, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Willard Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, Donald
Davidson.  Apel  and  Habermas’  pragmatic  version  of  normativity  is  explicitly
reminiscent of Peirce (mostly for Apel) and Mead (mostly for Habermas), and their shift
from subjectivity to the new paradigm of intersubjectivity parallels the developments
of the philosophy of ordinary language worked out by Austin and Searle, so that the
linguistic  turn  and  the  pragmatic  turn  can  be  read  as  two  aspects  of  the  same
phenomenon. Putnam’s and Rorty’s different interpretations of pragmatism reflect two
different ways of thinking about a crucial issue like truth: in Putnam’s view, it  is a
limiting concept that allows a progressive move towards factual reality, while in Rorty
it  is  transferred  into  a  hermeneutic  and  historicist  context,  that  leads  to  the
acknowledgment of the social, linguistic, cultural nature of reality itself. Quine, Sellars
and  Davidson,  finally,  can  be  read,  as  Calcaterra  proposes,  as  not  abandoning  but
reformulating  realism,  so  that  the  interference  between  the  logical  and  empirical
dimension  implies  a  concept  of  truth  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  sense-data,  but
entails  a  more  sophisticated  form  of  correspondentism,  where  naturalism  and  the
criterion of intersubjectivity can interact. The search for new criterions for objectivity
is probably one of the most important, but not the only, issue on which this dialogue is
not only promising, but also needed.
3 This  is  also  underlined  by  Michele  Marsonet,  who  in  his  “Different  Pragmatist
Reactions to Analytic Philosophy” adds some historical notes. Pragmatism and analytic
philosophy – he affirms – share many similarities,  such as the interest in scientific
results and methods and the request that philosophers give serious reasons in support
of  their  assertions,  aspects  which  can  be  traced  back  to  the  key  role  that
intersubjectivity plays in both traditions. This has undoubtedly been fundamental in
the  initial  encounter  between  them.  Later,  Marsonet  says,  neopositivists  endorsed
scientism while pragmatists did not, as they denied the existence of one and only one
true method to be adopted both by science and philosophy. This historical frame is
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what enables Marsonet to introduce the not so well-known figure of Nicholas Rescher,
whose  originality  is  often  neglected.  He  compares  Rescher  with  Quine,  Sellars  and
Rorty, portraying his pragmatic idealism as rooted in evolutionism and in a new and
sometimes problematic account of the relation between factual and logical truths as
well  as  between  subject  and  object.  In  the  distance  between  Rescher  and  Rorty,
particularly, he sees a continuation of the difference between the objective pragmatism
as  defined  by  Peirce  and  Lewis  (and  Rescher)  and  the  subjective  pragmatism
represented by James and the early Dewey (and Rorty). He concludes that the end of
philosophy prophesized by Rorty is inevitably considered by Rescher a wrong answer to
the  acknowledgment  that  philosophy  cannot  detach  itself  from  history;  on  the
opposite, philosophical activity, as a sort of “intellectual accommodation,” is requested
in our everyday life at least as much as physical accommodation.
4 Turning  from  the  historical  to  the  more  theoretical  issues,  the  relation  between
pragmatism and analytic philosophy rotates around some main themes, which can be
used as guides to give an idea of the different points of view that are expressed in the
single  essays.  These  themes  can  be  individuated  as  couples  of  entangled  concepts:
naturalism  and  scientism;  facts  and  values;  actions  and  practices;  perception  and
meaning;  truth  and  realism.  We  can  thus  deal  with  some  aspect  of  the  different
contributions  by  means  of  dealing  with  these  main  concepts,  avoiding  a  plain




5 According to Marsonet, as we have just seen, the first big divide between analytics and
pragmatists was that the former endorsed scientism, the latter refused it in the name
of methodological pluralism. Between the two world wars the move towards the rigor
of scientific discourse had success, but later on, when the underground influence of
pragmatism came more openly to the surface, the entanglement between science and
ethics  and  the  impossibility  of  a  perfectly  neutral  scientific  method  were  more
commonly  acknowledged.  Also,  we  could  add,  what  was  going  on  in  the  field  of
philosophy of science, with Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, was not that distant
from these perspectives. But what sort of relation can be drawn between scientism and
naturalism,  considered  that  naturalism  was,  differently  from  scientism,  usually
supported by the pragmatist scholars? A clarifying contribution in this direction comes
from Mario De Caro’s essay, “Beyond Scientism,” that aims to define and distinguish
scientism, scientific naturalism and other forms of naturalism. Scientific naturalism, as
it is ordinarily described by its supporters, De Caro argues, can be characterized by
three main claims: the constitutive thesis, for which philosophy does not admit any
supernatural entity; the antifoundationalist thesis, for which there is no such thing as a
“first philosophy”; the continuity thesis, for which philosophy must be a partner of
science. But scientific naturalism thus conceived can be criticized for different reasons.
One  of  these  is  that  it  often  idealizes  contemporary  science  describing  it  as
methodologically  and  ontologically  unified,  where  it  is  not;  here,  again,  we  meet
methodological pluralism as a (pragmatist) opponent to scientism, similarly to what we
found  in  Marsonet.  De  Caro  espouses  a  weaker  version  of  the  three  premises  of
scientific naturalism, and pointing towards what here and elsewhere he calls liberal or
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liberalized  naturalism,1 he  agrees  with  many  issues  of  pragmatism,  such  as,  for
example, the compatibility but not the reduction of philosophy to scientific theories,
and the insistence that values and facts can hardly be detached from each other. What
this  description leaves  open to  a  further  analysis,  is  how pragmatism itself  can be
studied  as  proposing  not  one  single  form,  but  different  forms  of  naturalism,  in
connection with the different ideas of science that its representatives held. It could
indeed be interesting to go beyond an abstract identification of the characteristics of
scientism and naturalism, to investigate whether and how classical and contemporary




6 As regards the entanglement between facts and values, which we have just mentioned,
two  other  essays  contained  in  Calcaterra’s  volume  have  to  be  considered:  Rossella
Fabbrichesi’s  “The  Entanglement  of  Ethics  and  Logic  in  Peirce’s  Pragmatism”  and
Giovanni  Maddalena’s  “Wittgenstein,  Dewey  and  Peirce  on  Ethics,”  which  share  an
interest in Peirce’s ethics and in its connection with logic and the hierarchy of sciences.
Fabbrichesi traces back Putnam’s idea of the entanglement between facts and values to
Peirce’s  normativity  of  logic.  Putnam,  criticizing  how  neopositivist  and  analytic
philosophers often attempted to keep rigidly separated facts and values, points out that
the ideals of scientific and theoretical research are implicitly ethic, in their preferring
consistency,  simplicity,  plausibility,  order;  and  notes  that  pragmatism  already  had
affirmed that in every acknowledgment of  a “pure fact” there is  a value judgment.
Peirce includes logic, together with ethics and aesthetics, in the normative sciences and
this inclusion is the reflection of his idea of pragmatic meaning. Fabbrichesi’s paper
focuses then on Peirce’s “future-tense conception” of interpretation and inference and
on the bond between this ethical commitment and the public nature of truth, linking it
to  the  dialectic  between the particular  and the general.  As  regards  Maddalena,  his
starting point is a question: is Rorty right in affirming the surrender of philosophy to
literature  and  to  politics,  on  the  grounds  of  the  ineluctable  gap  between  what  is
normative and what is real? He first examines Wittgenstein and Dewey’s accounts of
ethics (the two philosophers that Rorty mainly refers to), and then proposes Peirce’s
theory  as  a  way  out  that  permits  to  avoid  Rorty’s  conclusion.  Wittgenstein,  in  the
Tractatus and in the 1929 Conference on ethics,2 considers ethics as a view of the world,
and then as a phenomenological experience, but not as a science of behavior. In the
Philosophical  Investigations,3 the  absolute  value  has  lost  its  absoluteness  and  is  now
embodied in use and in life,  but again we cannot make of ethics a science. What is
normative  and  what  is  real  are  separate.  In  Dewey,  there  is  an  apparent  unity  of
thought and practice, consciousness and reality, but if we look at his philosophy more
accurately, according to Maddalena, we see that dualism is both the starting point of
his analysis of moral theory (desire and thought),4 and the always present risk of its
conclusion, because in social values we can see a double aspect: private satisfaction and
public utility (Maddalena, 90). So in Dewey too we cannot say that what is normative
and what is real are really unite.  On the contrary, if  we consider Peirce’s view and
particularly his semiotics and his classification of sciences, we find a final unity. Ethics
indeed is inserted in a hierarchy of sciences, it has a precise role in knowledge and
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continuity among sciences is a reality: this is what could prevent Rorty from drawing
his dualistic conclusion. 
7 Fabbrichesi  and  Maddalena’s  insights  seem  to  converge  on  the  relevance  of  the
continuity between logic, science and ethics, though their perspective do not perfectly
overlap. In the latter’s case, with reference to Wittgenstein, it is said that if we cannot
make of ethics a science, it means that ethics and reality are separate. But we could
work also in the opposite direction, and ask ourselves whether science has not in itself
already  an  ethical  dimension.  In  the  later  Wittgenstein  we  may  find  exactly  this
suggestion, that is, the idea that any description of reality is part of a Weltbild and has a
normative dimension. Thus, it is not only in Peirce, but also in Wittgenstein, that we
could find the entanglement between facts and values and between logic and ethics.
Furthermore, going back to Fabbrichesi’s analysis of the public dimension of inference
and truth,  new elements  for  a  useful  comparison could  be  found in  Wittgenstein’s
treatment of following a rule and of the impossibility of a private language. 
 
Actions and Practices
8 Vincent Colapietro’s contribution (“Allowing our Practices to Speak for Themselves”)
goes in this direction, comparing Wittgenstein and Peirce on rules and practices and
challenging the traditional view according to which Wittgenstein’s so-called quietism is
at  odds  with  the  pragmatists’  meliorism.  The  centrality  of  practices  and  the  later
Wittgenstein’s work to clarify what they are, how they function, which is our place
inside  them,  in  Colapietro’s  opinion  still  needs  to  be  appreciated  by  pragmatists.
Practices are not decided by rules and rules are not fixed; we learn to follow rules in
familiar and social  contexts,  with other people as teachers and judges,  we learn by
doing and do by learning. We are compelled but also free in the same time, so that our
practices must be granted the opportunity to speak for themselves.
9 An interesting connection can be drawn here with John McDowell’s characterization (in
his “Pragmatism and Intention-in-Action,” still in this volume) of the pragmatist idea
of action as an exercise of a skill, manifesting a practical intelligence, a conception that
avoids commitment to the Cartesian image of thought as something happening in a
separated  inner  realm.  The  relation  that,  following  Colapietro,  we  can  establish
between a practice and its rule, parallels the relation that, following McDowell, we can
establish between an action and its intentional content. Just like practice embodies a
rule, and does not simply apply it, action embodies an intention, and does not simply
apply it. There is no gap between practice and rule, nor between action and intention.
McDowell particularly examines Sellars’ and Brandom’s models for intention-in-action
and concludes that none of the two truly respect the pragmatist conception of action,
because they both remain anchored to the idea that action is something that comes
after thought. Starting from Sellars, who actually does not conceive his proposal as a
variety of pragmatism, McDowell argues that he thinks of unexpressed thought on the
model of speech, and of linguistic practices as language games.5 He distinguishes three
moves in language games: those starting from outside the game and finishing inside it
(language-entry  transitions,  like  reports  of  perceptions),  those  within  the  game
(intralinguistic transitions, inferences) and those starting from language and finishing
in action (language-exit transitions); practical reasoning in this model is precisely what
constitutes the starting point for actions. In this way, actions are conceived as exits
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from the sphere of the conceptual, and this can hardly accord with the pragmatist idea
of thought as present in behavior and not separable from behavior. Brandom, on the
other hand,6 who explicitly declares his theory to be pragmatist, applies the Sellarsian
vision  of  actions  as  exits  only  in  connection  with  intentions  for  the  future,  and
characterizes intentions-in-actions in a strict sense according to an idea of action as
acknowledging a commitment. But conceiving practical commitments as dispositions to
say “yes” to an action, in McDowell’s reading, Brandom, too, thinks about intention-in-
action as a response to something (this is what an assent is), and thus not really “in”
action, but separate from it. For this reason, according to McDowell, neither Sellars nor
Brandom have caught the pragmatist intuition of conceiving intention-in-action as a
practical skill to be found within the action itself.
10 It may be, then and again, in Wittgenstein’s idea of practices, read through Colapietro’s
lenses, that such an account could find a good interlocutor. Following, among others,
Stanley Cavell  and Naomi Scheman,7 Colapietro also helps us to see in Wittgenstein
both the search for the ordinary and the escape from the ordinary,  so that human
practices are at the same time our home and our prison, and we are called not only to
acknowledge our traditions – what has usually been associated with Wittgenstein – but
also to acknowledge that our home is always an exile. In this light, Colapietro invites us
not to forget the polemic and critical aspect of many of Wittgenstein’s remarks, which




11 The theme of intention-in-action leads us into another set of correlated concepts, such
as  those  of  perception,  conceptual  content,  representation,  meaning,  and  more
generally  the  relation  between  mind  and  world,  to  remain  in  a  McDowellian
framework.8 Nathan  Houser  (“Action  and  representation  in  Peirce’s  pragmatism”),
stating the difficulty of defining both analytic philosophy and pragmatism, explores the
possibility of a dialogue between these two “family resembles” schools of thought by
applying Peirce’s idea of perception and of experience to the problem of the relation
between  mind  and  world,  as  addressed  by  McDowell.  Indeed,  Peirce’s  concept  of
thought as answerable to the world and at the same time instrumental in the course of
events,  seems  to  fit  perfectly  in  McDowell’s  dilemma  of  how  thought  (which  is
normative) can be tested in “the tribunal of experience” (which is natural). Normative
thought, that is, all thought – Peirce would agree with McDowell on this – belongs to
the logical space of reason; therefore, how can experience be a valid test or tribunal for
it? Can we prove our concepts to be correct if experience is conceived as exclusively
sensory and not conceptual? This is  where Peirce’s  ideas of  perception,  experience,
knowledge can be of help. Houser focuses on this well-known passage by Peirce: “The
elements of  every concept enter into logical  thought at  the gate of  perception and
make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports
at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.”9 In perception,
Peirce sees two elements: the percept, which “forces upon us” and is absolutely dumb;
and the perceptual judgment, that professes to represent the percept, and belongs to
the logical space of reasons. What is the bridge between the two? It is – Houser argues –
a virtually unconscious “proto-abductive inference that relies more on instinct than on
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reason” (Houser, 67). The point is that these perceptual judgments are to be checked
not by a backwards appeal to sensory experience, but by experiences to come, so that
our conduct, the outcome of thought, will be justified or falsified by future experience.
In this way, experience do indeed serve as a tribunal for the reliability of conceived
consequences.  Whether  this  reference  to  the  future,  and  the  enlargement  of  the
concept  of  experience  that  is  so  pointed  out,  meets  the  need  for  a  reconciliation
between the two reigns of sensibility and intellect, and whether this accords or not
with McDowell’s own solution of the problem, is surely a matter worth working on in
still more detail. 
12 Another essay that focuses on the relation between mind and world is Eva Picardi’s
“Pragmatism  as anti-representationalism?,”  which  is  particularly  centered  on  the
nature of thought and on whether it is true or not that, as Rorty affirms,10 pragmatism
conceives  it  as  inferentional  and  not  representational.  In  Rorty’s  view,
representationalism leads to relativism, because, as Donald Davidson has shown,11 any
representation  is  relative  to  a  scheme.  Although  some  representationalist’s  central
issues – such as that “thinking at” is prior to “thinking that” and that a given sentences
has always a definite meaning – are too stark, in Picardi’s opinion their critiques to
representationalism are not always wrong; for example when they point out that for
inferentialists  it  is  difficult  to  explain  the  compositionality  of  meaning.  Picardi’s
conclusion  is  that  Rorty’s  idea  of  anti-representationalism  as  a  univocally  positive
characteristic of pragmatism is over simplified. Anti-representationalism is not always
a  feature  of  pragmatism,  neither  old  nor  new,  and  it  is  not  always  a  merit;
representationalism itself, though purified from some of its questionable tenets, can be
useful for good theories of meaning and of thought. Thus, in Picardi’s articulated work,
the relation between pragmatism and analytic philosophy appears to be much more
complex that any simple account could represent.
 
Truth and Realism
13 The last couple of themes with which we can close our review is the most general and,
probably, the one on which there has been the highest number of misunderstandings in
the history of pragmatism: the concept of truth and the idea of realism that it entails.
The two essays which will help us to clarify the matter are Maurizio Ferraris’ “Indiana
James” and Ivo Assad Ibri’s  “Semiotics  and Epistemology: The Pragmatic  Ground of
Communication”;  the former is  linked to the traditional  early-analytic  critique that
Bertrand Russell moved to the pragmatist conception of truth, the latter develops what
we can call a semiotic conception of reality. Ferraris’ aim is to investigate James’ theory
of truth relating it to the problem of ontology, thus also clarifying Russell’s criticism
towards him. James’ theory of truth is baptized by Russell “Transatlantic Truth”12 and
is identified with this definition: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate,
corroborate and verify.”13 Ferraris takes this to mean that truth is what is convenient
for us to believe, and on the basis of this he confronts James’ positive attitude towards
the existence of God with his (James’) negative attitude towards the hypothesis of the
“Automatic Sweetheart,” a soulless body indistinguishable from a lovely human being
(an example famously discussed also by Hilary Putnam14). If truth is what is convenient
for  us  to  believe  –  asks  Ferraris  –  why  shouldn’t  we  believe  in  the  Automatic
Sweetheart? The answer is that, in refusing to believe this, James is actually accepting
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the corrispondentist theory of truth, or what Ferraris calls the “Pacific Truth.” Pacific
Truth is committed to ontology, that is, to the idea that objects are what resists our
will, and in refusing the Automatic Sweetheart – this is Ferraris’ diagnosis - James is
revealing  never  to  have  abandoned  this  idea.  In  Ferraris  opinion,  this  shows  that
Russell and James were not talking about the same thing: Russell was concerned with
ontology, James with epistemology, or – at best – with a theory of scientific knowledge.
Unfortunately,  Ferraris  relegates  James’  reformulation  of  the  criterion  of
correspondence to a footnote (Ferraris,  58),  and in so doing he probably misses the
point of a serious reconsideration of what is at stake. Evidently Ferraris assumes that
only  a  strong  commitment  with  an  ontologically  based  theory  of  truth  allows  the
hypothesis of knowing what is true and what is not. But this seems to be the premise, as
much  as  the  conclusion,  of  his  argument.  Let  us  consider  James’  words  about
correspondence, even limiting our investigation to the short passage cited by Ferraris:
to agree with reality is “to be guided” towards it or “to be put onto a working touch
with  it  as  to  handle  it  […]  better  than  if  we  disagreed.”15 Ferraris  considers  this
definition as “not very convincing,” but reading through James’  undoubtedly vague
words we can foresee an idea of correspondence in which the direction (“to be guided”)
and the skill or the ability to do something (“to handle it better”) are key features. It is
here that the last essay which we are considering can be of help. Ivo Ibri (“Semiotics
and Epistemology: the Pragmatic Ground of Communication”), working not on James
but on Peirce, proposes an idea of reality according to which the world is, by itself,
meaningful. That is: language is not the creator of sense, but a mere representative of
sense, whereas meanings are already in the world and in its natural signs. Perceiving
the natural signs contained in the world, we are guided by them, as James suggested, so
that a Peircean semiotic conception of reality can be put directly in relation to James’
“Transatlantic  Truth.”  Realism and semiotics  in Peirce are linked with his  complex
philosophical system: Ibri’s essay offers an interesting reading, that we can sum up in
the  expression  “semiotic  realism.”  Peirce’s  three  categories  and  his vision  of  a
symmetry between subject and object are the starting points of Ibri’s argument, that at
its very beginning needs to face a seemingly unavoidable circularity: on the one hand,
realism seems the necessary ground for semiotics and logic, and, on the other, if we
want to read signs in reality, semiotics must shape the ground for realism itself. It is
indeed the symmetry between subject and object, phenomenologically understood as
modes of being, that permits to avoid circularity acknowledging that their respective
structure is the same, and knowledge is materialized in the universal forms of objects.
But this leads us beyond language, because reality does not manifest its segnic quality
only by linguistic concepts. In other words, we must acknowledge a semiotic nature
also to each natural and human occurrence. For this to be possible, there has to be a
continuity  between  experience  and  concept,  and  this  is  what  is  meant  by  Peirce’s
idealism of objective content, that does not conflict with, but rather strengthen, his
realism. Peirce’s logic, read through the lenses of his realism, allows a wider conception
of semiotics that concerns not only language but the world itself, characterized by a
meaningful nature. 
14 The link between Ibri’s reading and the issue raised by Houser, regarding mind and
world and the conceptual nature of perception, is, I think, clear, and it is clear that,
according to this reading, the idea of truth that pragmatism entails is not confined to
epistemology but has deep ontological consequences. This evidently contrasts Ferraris’
“new  realist”  conception  of  truth  and  his  interpretation  of  James,  and  highlights
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ontology as one of the main themes on which the dialogue between pragmatists and
analytics still has much to say.
 
Two More Suggestions and a Conclusion
15 Finally, it must be mentioned that the Italian edition of the volume16 also includes two
more essays, by Rosa Calcaterra and by Damiano Canale and Giovanni Tuzet: they were
unfortunately  left  out  of  the  English  edition  due  to  technical  reasons,  but  it  is
nevertheless  much  worth  devoting  some  words  to  them  too.  Calcaterra’s  essay
particularly can be connected to the debate on realism: it deals with James’ conception
of truth as it is seen by Hilary Putnam. The intertwinement among truth, utility and
reality that characterizes James’ position and his adoption of truth as a regulative ideal
are central for Putnam’s reflection on internal realism and for his proposal of truth as
an  idealization  of  warranted  assertability.  The  dimension  of  collectivity  is  here
introduced  as  another  mainstay  of  realism,  and,  again,  the  dialogue  between
pragmatist  and  analytic  traditions  confirms  to  be  the  most  current  and  topical:
Ferraris’ “new realism” and his work on documentality, but also John Searle’s social
ontology,  owe  much  to  the  acknowledgement  of  the  relevance  of  this  collective
dimension  in  the  building  of  reality  itself.  Another  interesting  comparison  is
presentend in Canale and Tuzet’s essay, which confronts Peirce, Searle and Brandom on
the  theory  of  assertion,  particularly  focusing  on  the  kind  of  commitment  and
responsibility that an assertion entails: does it commit the speaker to the truth of what
he asserts, or to the sincerity of his words? The most interesting position is here that of
Brandom, whose starting point is the social practice of attributing and acknowledging
beliefs to the speakers on the basis of their assertions. Adopting this typical pragmatist
criterion, he is able to overcome the limits of a conception of belief based on mental
states, and to work on what in Peirce had remained implicit, that is, the distinction
between two kind of  inferences:  one going from the assertion to the beliefs,  which
commits the speaker to sincerity; the other going from the assertion to its practical
consequences, which commits the speaker to the truth of what he says. 
16 To sum up and conclude,  the  essays  collected  in  Calcaterra’s  volume are  excellent
examples  of  how  the  two  traditions  of  pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy,  when
working  together,  are  able  to  clarify  their  own identities  and to  produce  new and
sometimes  unexpected results.  Furthermore,  it  is  worth noticing  how the  different
attitudes  expressed in  the essays  are  reflected in  different  interpretations  that  the
authors  give  of  some key figures.  For  example,  Colapietro and Maddalena’s  idea of
Wittgenstein  and  particularly  of  Wittgentein’s  ethics  are  quite  different,  since  the
former,  focusing on the importance of  practices  and on their  primacy above rules,
tends to connect directly the ethical  dimension with the descriptive one;  while the
latter affirms that the two dimensions are clearly distinguished both in the early and
the later Wittgenstein. Besides, Michele Marsonet and Eva Picardi clearly diverge on
the  interpretation  of  Rorty’s  philosophy  on  relativism:  Marsonet  equates  Rorty  to
relativism, while Picardi highlights that it is because Rorty wants to avoid relativism
that he espouses (incorrectly, in her view) anti-representationalism. The presence of
these differences is, I think, one of the positive qualities of this book, as it shows that
the  debate  is  still  open  and  lively.  To  make  pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy
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interact seems to be a precious means for doing philosophy, that is, to see things from
different perspectives in order to get a more complete idea of their meanings.
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